### 1nc

#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

### 1nc

#### Immigration will pass now – momentum

**Parnes 10/18**

Amie, The Hill, Obama’s hollow debt victory, 10/18/13, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory

Another former White House official saw things differently and argued Obama now has a real shot at securing a victory on the immigration bill.¶ “The trick here is to capitalize on the moment without spiking the football,” the former official said. “On immigration, if he could tailor what he’s doing as part of functionality and not as politics, that would be key."¶ Cal Jillson, a professor of political science at Southern Methodist University said Obama could capitalize on the victory simply by seizing on a Republican Party “in disarray.”¶ On immigration, “it’s a question of whether he can develop the issue in such a way that that it’ll give them little choice,” Jillson said, adding that Obama “can make the argument that it is critical in a number of ways.”

#### Liberalizing policy towards Cuba costs capital – Congress will upset other items on the agenda

**LeoGrande 12**

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Capital is key – allows Obama to thread the needle – there’s momemtum now

**McMorris-Santoro 10/15**

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### Immigration k2 biotech

**Dahms 3**, (executive director of the California State University System Biotechnology Program (CSUPERB); chair of the Workforce Committee, Biotechnology Industry Organization; and a member of the ASBMB Education and Professional Development Committee, (A. Stephen, “ Foreign Scientists Seen Essential to U.S. Biotechnology,” in Pan-Organizational Summit on the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Meeting Summary, National Academy of Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/picrender.fcgi?book=nap10727&blobtype=pdf>)

The scarcity of skilled technicians is seen by the biotechnology industry in the U.S. and Canada as one of its most serious challenges. The success of this industry is dependent on the quality of its workforce, and the skills and talents of highly trained people are recognized as one of the most vital and dynamic sources of competitive advantage. The U.S. biotechnology industry workforce has been growing 14 to 17 percent annually over the last six years and is now over 190,000 and conservatively estimated to reach 500,000 by 2012. Despite efforts by the industry to encourage U.S. institutions to increase the production of needed specialists, a continual shortfall in the needed expertise requires access to foreign workers. Foreign workers with unique skills that are scarce in the U.S. can get permission to stay in the U.S. for up to six years under the H1B classification, after which they can apply for permanent resident status. There are currently over 600,000 foreign workers in this category across all industries, and they are critical to the success and global competitiveness of this nation. Of these H-1B visa holders, 46 percent are from India and 10 percent are from China, followed in descending order by Canada, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, U.K., Pakistan, and the Russian Federation. Our annual national surveys have demonstrated that between 6 and 10 percent of the biotechnology workforce have H-1B visas. The constant shortfall in specialized technical workers that has been experienced by the biotechnology industry over the past six years has been partially alleviated by access to talented individuals from other nations. However, the industry’s need is sufficient to justify a 25 percent increase in H-1Bs in 2004. Biotechnology industry H-1B visa holders are mainly in highly sought after areas such as analytical chemistry, instrumentation specialization, organic synthesis, product safety and surveillance, clinical research/biostatistics, bio/pharm quality, medicinal chemistry, product scale-up, bioinformatics and applied genomics, computer science, cheminformatics, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Forty percent of H-1B foreign workers are at the Ph.D. level, 35 percent M.S., 20 percent B.S., and 5 percent M.D. In comparison, the U.S. biotechnology industry technical workforce is estimated to be 19 percent Ph.D., 17 percent M.S., 50 percent B.S., and 14 percent combined voc-ed/ community college trained. These and other survey data by industry human resource groups clearly show that the H-1B worker skills match the most pressing employment needs of the biotechnology industry. The data demonstrate that maintaining a reasonably-sized H-1B cap is critical to the industry. Although the national annual H-1B visa cap was raised from 115,000 to 195,000 in the 106th Congress via S. 2045, the cap has already been exceeded. The increased cap remains in effect until 2003 and efforts are under way to ensure that it remains high. The Third Annual National Survey of H-1Bs in the biotechnology industry found that 80 percent are from U.S. universities, and 85 percent of those eventually get green cards. Companies now spend, on average, $10,200 in processing fees and legal expenses to obtain each green card, an estimated cost to the industry of more than $150 million over the past 5 years. In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, debate has been focused on more restrictions on foreign students, a development that would have a severe impact upon the competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry. Clearly, the H-1B route provides a temporary solution to shortages in the national and domestic biotechnology labor pools, shortages mirroring the inadequate production of appropriately trained U.S. nationals by U.S. institutions of higher learning. The reality is that universities have inadequate resources for expanding the training pipeline, particularly in the specialized areas of the research phase of company product development. Efforts should be directed toward influencing greater congressional and federal agency attention to these important topics.

#### Extinction

**Trewavas, 2K** – Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh  
(Anthony, “GM Is the Best Option We Have,” 6/5/2000, [www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best\_option.html](http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html))

In 535A.D. a volcano near the present **Krakatoa** exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would **destroy** much of our **civilisation**. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding **asteroids** are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be **the only buffer between** us and **annihilation**. When people say to me they do not need GM, I am astonished at their prescience, their ability to read a benign future in a crystal ball that I cannot. Now is the time to experiment; not when a holocaust is upon us and it is too late. GM is a technology whose time has come and just in the nick of time. With each billion that mankind has added to the planet have come technological advances to increase food supply. In the 18th century, the start of agricultural mechanisation; in the 19th century knowledge of crop mineral requirements, the eventual Haber Bosch process for nitrogen reduction. In the 20th century plant genetics and breeding, and later the green revolution. Each time population growth has been sustained without enormous loss of life through starvation even though crisis often beckoned. For the 21st century, genetic manipulation is our **primary hope** to maintain developing and complex technological civilisations. When the **climate is changing** in unpredictable ways, diversity in agricultural technology is a strength and a necessity not a luxury. Diversity helps secure our food supply. We have heard much of the **precautionary principle** in recent years; my version of it is "be prepared".

### 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government should condition [normalizing trade relations] on the Republic of Cuba agreeing to implement environmental regulations in Cuba

#### Conditioning the Embargo on Environmental protection solves the aff - is key to environmental leadership. Lifting the embargo alone dooms the environment.

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

Unlike the U.S., which still has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to 2008. This decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse Cuba’s substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana, Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist. Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public image in the international arena. The developmental assistance and economic growth potential that might stem from a U.S.-Cuba partnership might aid in developing enforceable implementation strategies. Even though Cuba’s written regulations characteristically lack feasible, implementable standards. Cuban laws, currently in effect, do provide a foundation for greater conservation activity in the future. The Cuban government does show an interest in encouraging sustainable development initiatives in the future, yet its laws are all based on maintaining a centralized government featuring a command economy. For example, CITMA appears to be trying to affect change, but many aspects of Cuba’s bureaucracy are rooted in the past and it remains difficult to update the ways of an outdated administrative substructure. If the embargo is lifted without a robust partnership and plans for environmental sustainability, the invasion of U.S. consumerism may seriously damage the island.

#### The impact is extinction – its linear

**Diner 94** – Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army

[David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, LN]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### 1nc

**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction

**Escobar 95** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill

(Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistance have much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics, patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central role in support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

### leadership

#### Taiwan no longer a hotspot for conflict – means no china war

**Zhang 11** -Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong July 14

Baohui, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship The Prospects for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 2, pp. 311–332, Proquest

Until May 2008, the Taiwan Strait was a hot spot for military conflicts thatcould potentially drag China and the U.S. into a major war**.** This prospectput tremendous pressure on the PLA to search for ways to counter the massive conventional military superiority of the U.S.Now, because of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’saccommodation strategy toward Beijing, a new cross-strait relationship has emerged. Militarytension and pernicious mutual mistrust have given way to institutionalizeddialogues, expanded economic integration, and greater people-to-people exchanges. Indeed, the Taiwan Strait situation has been completely altered since Ma assumed the presidency in May 2008. he Taiwan Afairs Oice of the State Council of China has declared that cross-strait relations have “achieved a historical transformation.” his new and positive assessment has drastically changed the PLA’s perception of the prospects for war in the strait, and thus the possibility of U.S. military intervention. Major GeneralPeng Guangqian of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences commented that economic integration and institutionalized political dialogues would makemilitary conflict in the Taiwan Strait “unlikely and even unthinkable.” 48 Yan Xuetong, an inluential Chinese international relations scholar with close ties to the military, has also revised his past pessimistic views. Whereas he once insisted that war in the strait was inevitable, he now believes that the probability is, currently, extremely low. 49 With minimized chances of military conlict occurring in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA should no longer be obsessed with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Indeed**,** the Taiwan Strait constitutes the only realistically plausible cause of war between China and the U.S. As noted earlier, Major General Jin Yinan recently concluded that the prospect of such a militaryconflict was extremely unlikely**.** The new Taiwan Strait situation could play a major role in improving theU.S.-China military space relationship. The fear of U.S. intervention wasonce an important reason for the PLA’s pursuit of space warfare capabilitiesNow, the Chinese military should perceive no compelling reason to developspacewarfare capabilities to level the playing field**.**

#### No impact to heg.

**Fettweis 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Hegemony inevitable- power is relative

**Bremmer and Gordon 12/27** (Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?” David F. Gordon, former director of policy planning at the State Department, is head of research at Eurasia Group, “An Upbeat View of America's 'Bad' Year”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/opinion/an-upbeat-view-of-americas-bad-year.html?pagewanted=all>, December 27, 2011,

Among global big thinkers, never a bashful crowd, the notion of a United States in decline has become conventional wisdom. In late 2011, this narrative has crescendoed, with experts arguing that China has surpassed the United States economically, Niall Ferguson declaring that we are at “the end of 500 years of Western predominance” and The National Interest proclaiming “the end of the American era.” Even the National Intelligence Council’s coming Global Trends 2030 study reportedly assumes an America in decline. As 2011 draws to a close, the U.S. military’s exit from Iraq and challenges in Afghanistan along with American vulnerability to the European crisis provide further confirmation of the decline narrative. We agree with some of these views. The United States has neither the willingness nor the capability to provide the kind of global leadership that it has provided in the past several decades, and other countries are increasingly less willing to follow America’s lead. But the conventional wisdom obscures as much as it reveals. Specifically, the declinists overlook the inconvenient truth that global power is relative. And comparing America’s year to that of our present and potential adversaries paints an interesting picture: 2011 was not the year when the United States fell off the wagon. Instead, a look back at the past 12 months suggests that U.S. power is more resilient than the narrative of inevitable decline portrays. Take Al Qaeda, our most consistent adversary (by their definition and ours) since the 9/11 attacks. Despite some severe missteps, we have in 10 years degraded Al Qaeda’s capabilities to the point that they are having difficulty mounting attacks against significant targets. In 2011, the United States killed Al Qaeda’s most effective propagandist, Anwar al-Awlaki; its operating chief, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman; and of course its founder, chief executive and spiritual leader, Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the Arab Spring undercut the notion that political change in the Middle East requires the violent jihad that Bin Laden spent his career espousing. The fight against extremist Islam is an impossible one in which to declare success. Yet the fact remains that while Al Qaeda began the War on Terror with a horrific assault on the foremost symbols of U.S. economic and military power, it leaves 2011 effectively leaderless, rudderless and reduced to boasting about kidnapping defenseless U.S. aid workers. Iran’s leaders also exit 2011 in worse shape than they entered it. Early in the year, they viewed the demise of Middle Eastern potentates as accelerating their rise to regional dominance. Turkish anger over the Mavi Marmara incident continued to draw Ankara closer to Tehran. Saudi anger at the perceived lack of U.S. support for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak seemed to threaten a permanent rupture in the U.S. relationship with a key ally, and Iran assumed that it would be the beneficiary of declining American influence in the Arab World. But the Arab Spring has unfolded very differently. Iran’s closest, most vital, and in some ways only Arab ally, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, ends the year leading an embattled, isolated regime facing a combination of civil war and economic sanctions that his government is unlikely to survive. Iran’s relationship with Turkey has deteriorated sharply, and, along with Saudi Arabia, Ankara has in fact drawn closer to the United States. Indeed, the nascent U.S.-Turkey-Saudi troika is one of the most important but least noticed trends of the past few months. Combined with another year without nuclear weapons — the program apparently thwarted significantly by covert operations — and a tightening vise of economic sanctions, these events have left Iran’s leaders disoriented. After years of growing consensus, Iran’s elites are now increasingly fragmented and at one another’s throats. Moreover, Tehran spent the past few months engaged in a stunning series of blunders: plotting with Mexican drug dealers to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and allowing regime supporters to storm the British Embassy in Tehran, the combination of which has re-energized global efforts to squeeze Iran financially. The assumption that Iran is the emerging regional power has shattered. China, which most of the declinists identify as America’s greatest future rival, has likewise had a difficult 2011. With U.S. willingness to lead receding, the international spotlight has fallen on Beijing. And on every issue — the euro zone crisis, climate change and rebalancing the global economy — China has declined to take the lead, to criticism and dismay at home and abroad. Beijing has failed to reconcile rising domestic nationalism with assuaging its neighbors’ increasing alarm over Chinese economic sustainability and strategic hegemony. China’s miscalculations in Northeast and Southeast Asia have allowed the United States to reassert traditional alliances in the region (with Japan and South Korea), establish new beachheads (placing a permanent U.S. Marine Corps presence in Australia), and create a process and institutions (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) for a balanced Asia–Pacific regional architecture, rather than one dominated by the Middle Kingdom. Compared to this, 2011 has not been a bad year for America. It is a stretch to call the Iraq war a victory, but the endgame in the Afghan quagmire is slowly coming into focus. And for all our fiscal problems, global funding has to flow somewhere, and our capital markets are still unparalleled. China won’t internationalize the renminbi, the euro is fragile and gold is not a country. As a result, the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and U.S. Treasury bills the global financial safe haven. This will inevitably change in the long term, but not for quite some time. The unipolar moment is over. But for 2011 at least, the world order has remained the United States and the rest.

#### Chinese influence is not zerosum --- helps the US, and China can’t challenge US influence

**Xiaoxia, 13** – Economic Observer (Wang, “In America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence in Latin America”, Worldcrunch, 5/6, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

#### Influence is irrelevant

**Kagan, 06** ([Robert](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=16&prog=zgp&proj=zusr), senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Washington Post, 1/15, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr)

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

### trade

#### No bioterrorism and no impact

**Mueller 10** [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

#### No protectionism- international empirics prove.

**Dadush et al 11** (May. Uri, senior associate and director in Carnegie’s new International Economics Program, currently focuses on trends in the global economy and the global financial crisis, previously served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and before that as director of economic policy. He also served as the director of the Bank’s world economy group, leading the preparation of the Bank’s flagship reports on the international economy, Shimelse Ali, economist, Carnegie’s International Economics Program, Rachel Esplin Odell, junior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Is Protectionism Dying?”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/is_protectionism_dying.pdf> Pismarov)

Despite a limited increase in the incidence of protectionist measures during the recent financial and economic crisis, the effects on global trade appear small—the world, remarkably, did not resort to protectionism. In addition to the concerted stimulus measures, financial rescues, and the strengthening of lender-of-last-resort facilities that restricted the duration and depth of the economic downturn, the World Trade Organization’s disciplines, enforceable through its dispute settlement mechanism, no doubt played an important role .in staving off trade protection But this is only one part of the story. The increased resistance to protectionism is the result of a complex, mutually reinforcing set of legal and structural changes in the world economy that have made a return to protection more: costly and disruptive and have established new vested interests in open markets. These changes include National disciplines: Along with autonomous liberalization and a generally robust rule of law in the largest trading countries—which improve the • confidence of importers and exporters—national trade tribunals help prevent protectionism by providing a mechanism whereby individual firms can contest protectionist measures that impact their company. Many national governments have also developed explicit or implicit mechanisms for countering protectionism and ensuring that trade policy reflects the general interest Regional and bilateral agreements: In addition to codifying further tariff reductions, regional trade agreements—now covering over half of world • trade—contain provisions establishing dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can use to contest violations of the agreement and thereby defend against protectionism. Furthermore, such agreements have often established regular high-level dialogues on trade disputes, treaty implementation, and further liberalization, providing a mechanism for resolving serious violations of the agreement even if its formal juridical mechanisms are not utilized Facts on the ground”: The political resistance to backsliding on liberalization is stronger because trade has become more prevalent and inextricably woven into production and consumption patterns. The change in the political economy of protectionism is manifested in the increased interest of retailers and consumers in imports, the internationalization of production, and the rise of intra firm trade. Limiting trade in any one sector not only hurts those consumers, retailers, and firms that depend on imports for inputs, but also has repercussions for firms that operate both vertically (within a sector) and horizontally (across sectors) that depend on complex global production chains.

#### Cuban econ resilient – remittances, tourism, oil, and diversification

**Messa-Lago, 13** – Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (Carmelo, “The possible impact of the death of Chavez in the Cuban economy”, 12/03/2013, http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/articulos/el-posible-impacto-de-la-muerte-de-chavez-en-la-economia-cubana-283444, translated from Spanish by Google Translate)//eek

If substantially reduce or end Venezuelan aid (equivalent to more than a fifth of the Cuban GDP), the economic crisis in Cuba would be very strong but somewhat lower than the crisis of the 90s for several reasons: an income of $ 2,800 million for the foreign tourists was meager in 1990 foreign remittances which amount is not true but it is estimated between $ 2,000 and $ 3,000, which were much lower in 1990; 350,000 Cuban-Americans visiting the island each year and spend substantial resources; Cuba also produces more oil than in 1990 but still relies on 62% of imports, and finally there is now a more diversified trade partners in 1990 (42% versus 65% Venezuela with the USSR). Even with these palliatives, the blow would be powerful and Cubans would suffer another crisis similar to the Special Period. Raul Castro has sought alternative sources of trade and investment with other countries but not yet achieved substantial results.

#### Alt cause - current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI

**Feinberg 11** - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)//ID

Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning . Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings.

# 2nc

#### Use your ballot as a site to contest Eurocentric knowledge production --- they perpetuate a curriculum of imperialism --- it’s not just about debating but who has the best method for making our debates inclusive and productive.

**Baker 8**—Michael, University of Rochester, “Eurocentrism and the Modern/Colonial Curriculum: Towards a Post-Eurocentric Math & Science Education – A Critical Interpretive Review,” http://www.academia.edu/1517810/Towards\_a\_Post-Eurocentric\_Math\_and\_Science\_Education\_--\_A\_Critical\_Interpretive\_Review)//A-Berg

This essay reviews literature in science and mathematics education that assumes the possibilities for knowing the realities of the world through the official curriculum are reductively maintained within a Eurocentric cultural complex (Carnoy, 1974; Swartz, 1992;Willinsky, 1998). Eurocentrism will be described as the epistemic framework of colonial modernity, a framework through which western knowledge enabled and legitimated the global imposition of one particular conception of the world over all others. Eurocentrism is an ethnocentric projection onto the world that expresses the ways the west and thewesternized have learned to conceive and perceive the world. At the center of this ethnocentric projection are the control of knowledge and the maintenance of the conditions of epistemic dependency (Mignolo, 2000a).¶ Every conception of the “world” involves epistemological and ontological presuppositions interrelated with particular (historical and cultural) ways of knowing and being. All forms of knowledge uphold practices and constitute subjects (Santos, 2007a).What counts as knowledge and what it means to be human are profoundly interrelated(Santos, 2006). The knowledge that counts in the modern school curriculum, fromkindergarten to graduate school, is largely constructed and contained within an epistemic framework that is constitutive of the monocultural worldview and ideological project of western modernity (Meyer, Kamens & Benavot, 1992; Wallerstein, 1997, 2006; Lander,2002; Kanu, 2006; Kincheloe, 2008; Battiste, 2008). The monocultural worldview andethos of western civilization are based in part upon structures of knowledge and an epistemic framework elaborated and maintained within a structure of power/knowledge relations involved in five hundred years of European imperial/colonial domination(Quijano, 1999, p. 47). If our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is also to become more and not less democratic, schools and teachers must learn to incorporate theworldwide diversity of knowledges and ways of being (multiple epistemologies and ontologies) occluded by the hegemony of Eurocentrism. Academic knowledge andunderstanding should be complemented with learning from those who are living in andthinking from colonial and postcolonial legacies (Mignolo, 2000, p. 5).¶ Too many children and adults today (particularly those from non-dominant groups)continue to be alienated and marginalized within modern classrooms where knowledge and learning are unconsciously permeated by this imperial/colonial conception of the world. The reproduction of personal and cultural inferiority inherent in the modern educational project of monocultural assimilation is interrelated with the hegemony of western knowledge structures that are largely taken for granted within Eurocentric education (Dei,2008). Thus, in the field of education, “we need to learn again how five centuries of studying, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up and to educate the world” (Willinsky,1998, pp. 2-3). The epistemic and conceptual apparatus through which the modern worldwas divided up and modern education was institutionalized is located in the culturalcomplex called “Eurocentrism”.¶ Western education institutions and the modern curriculum, from the sixteenthcentury into the present, were designed to reproduce this Eurocentric imaginary under thesign of “civilization” (Grafton & Jardine, 1986; Butts, 1967, 1973). Eurocentric knowledge lies at the center of an imperial and colonial model of civilization that now threatens to destroy the conditions that make life possible (Lander, 2002, p. 245). From a post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon (described below), the present conditions of knowledge are embedded within a hegemonic knowledge apparatus that emerged withEuropean colonialism and imperialism in the sixteenth century (Philopose, 2007;Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Based upon hierarchical competition for power, control, and supremacy among the“civilized” nation-states, imperialism is an original and inherent characteristic of themodern western interstate system that emerged with the formation of sovereign Europeanterritorial states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wallerstein, 1973; Gong, 1984 ;Hindness, 2005; Agnew, 2003; Taylor & Flint, 2000). Closely interrelated withimperialism, colonialism involves a civilizing project within an ideological formation established to construct the way the world is known and understood, particularly through the production, representation, and organization of knowledge (Mignolo, 2000a; Kanu,2006). Colonialism reduces reality to the single dimension of the colonizer. Colonialism and imperialism impose on the world one discourse, one form of conscience, one science, one way of being in the world. “Post-colonial analysis leads to a simple realization: that theeffect of the colonizing process over individuals, over culture and society throughoutEurope’s domain was vast, and produced consequences as complex as they are profound”(Ashcroft, 2001a, p. 24).¶ In yet to be acknowledged ways, the Eurocentric curriculum, and western schoolingin general, are profoundly interrelated with both modern imperialism and colonialism.The persistence and continuity of Eurocentrism rather leads one to see it asa part of a habitus of imperial subjectivity that manifests itself in a particular kind of attitude”: the European attitude – a subset of a more encompassing “imperial attitude.” The Eurocentric attitude combines the search for theoria with the mythical fixation with roots and the assertion of imperial subjectivity. It produces and defends what Enrique Dussel hasreferred to as “the myth of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres, 2005b, p. 43). ¶ Western schooling reproduces this “Eurocentric attitude” in complicity with a globalizedsystem of power/knowledge relations, tacitly based upon white heterosexual malesupremacy (Kincheloe, 1998; Allen, 2001; Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006; Twine & Gallagher,2008; Akom, 2008a, 2008b). Eurocentrism is a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that relies on confusion between abstract universality and concrete world hegemony (Escobar, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 1999, 2000). Worldwide imperialexpansion and European colonialism led to the late nineteenth century worldwidehegemony of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2005, p. 56). Eurocentrism, in other words, refers to the hegemony of a (universalized) Euro-Anglo-American epistemological framework that governs both the production and meanings of knowledges and subjectivities throughout the world (Schott, 2001; Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Eurocentrism is an epistemological model that organizes the state, the economy,gender and sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge (Quijano, 2000). The production of Eurocentrism is maintained in specific political, economic, social and cultural institutions and institutionalized practices that began to emerge with the colonization of the Americasin the sixteenth century. The nation-state, the bourgeois family, the capitalist corporation, Eurocentric rationality, and western educational institutions are all examples of worldwideinstitutions and institutionalized practices that contribute to the production of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2008, pp. 193-194).¶ Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood withoutreference to the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over thelast five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized itseffects, and universalized its historical claims. Those structures of power include the economic (capitalism, capitalist property relations, markets andmodes of production, imperialism, etc.) the political (a system of nation-states, and the nation-form, most importantly, new organizations to handle problems presented by such a reordering of the world, new legal forms,etc.), the social (production of classes, genders, races, ethnicities, religiousforms as well as the push toward individual-based social forms), andcultural (including new conceptions of space and time, new ideas of thegood life, and a new developmentalist conception of the life-world) (Dirlik,1999, p. 8).¶ Eurocentric thinking is embedded in the concepts and categories through which the modernworld has been constructed. “The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behavior; law, tradition and community; reason, mathematics and science; what is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence” (Sardar, 1999, p. 44).¶ The mostly taken-for-granted definitions and conceptual boundaries of the academic disciplines and school subjects such as “philosophy”, “math”, “science”,“history”, “literature”, “literacy”, “humanities”, “education” are all Eurocentric constructions. If Eurocentrism is intrinsic in the way we think and conceptualize, it is also inherent in the way we organize knowledge. Virtually all the disciplines of social sciences, from economics to anthropology, emerged when Europe was formulating its worldview, and virtually all are geared to serving the need and requirements of Western society and promoting its outlook. Eurocentrism is entrenched in the way these disciplines are structured, the concepts and categories they use for analysis, and the way progress is defined with the disciplines (Joseph et al. 1990) (Sardar, 1999, p. 49).¶ This hegemonic knowledge formation envelops the modern school curriculum within an imperial/colonial paradigm legitimated by the rhetoric of modernity (i.e., equal opportunity, mobility, achievement gap, meritocracy, progress, development, civilization,globalization). Western education (colonial and metropolitan) reproduces imperial/colonial, monocultural, and deluded conceptions of and ways of being in the world (Mignolo, 2000a; Kincheloe, 2008). “The effect of Eurocentrism is not merely that it excludes knowledges and experiences outside of Europe, but that it obscures the very nature and history of Europe itself” (Dussel, 1993). Understanding Eurocentrism thus involves recognizing and denaturalizing the implicitly assumed conceptual apparatus and definitional powers of the west (Sardar, 1999, p. 44; Coronil, 1996). Individually,understanding Eurocentrism may also involve the experience of disillusionment and cultureshock as one begins to demythologize the dense mirage of modernity.¶ Yet, today, in the academic field of education, “Eurocentrism” is commonlyunderstood as a cultural perspective among political conservatives who ascribe to thesuperiority of western contributions (e.g., scientific, cultural and artistic) to world ivilization that in turn justify the continued exclusion of non-European cultures andknowledges in the curriculum (Collins & O’Brien, 2003). Understanding Eurocentrism as a conservative perspective on western culture and education ignores the historical claim that Eurocentrism is the framework for the production and control of knowledge – thatEurocentrism is the way the “modern” world has been constructed as a cultural projection.For many of us educated in the western tradition – within this still dominantepistemological framework -- a Eurocentric worldview may be all we know. We may not recognize that our enlightened, liberal versus conservative, university educated ways of thinking, knowing, and being are a reflection of a particular historical-cultural-epistemological world-view, different from and similar to a variety of other equally valid and valuable ways of knowing and being (Santos, 2007; Battiste, 2008). In other words, if we are “well educated”, we conceive, perceive, interpret, know, learn about, and (re)produce knowledge of the “world” through an ethnocentric cultural projection known as “Eurocentrism” (Ankomah, 2005).¶ This review begins therefore by situating Eurocentrism within the historical context of its emergence – colonial modernity – and proceeds to define Eurocentrism as the epistemic framework of colonial modernity. From this decolonial (or post-Eurocentric)historical horizon and framing of Eurocentrism, the second part will frame and review literature on the critique of Eurocentrism within mathematics and science education that represent alternatives to the hegemony of western knowledge in the classroom. This literature was searched for and selected because it provides critiques of Eurocentrism that include specific proposals for de-centering and pluralizing the school curriculum. The review concludes by summarizing, situating, and appropriating these two school subject proposals within a vision for a post-Eurocentric curriculum. In framing, selecting, andreviewing literature that challenges and reconceptualizes the underlying Eurocentric assumptions of the modern school curriculum, this literature review adopts from critical philosophical (Haggerson, 1991), interpretive (Eisenhardt, 1998), and creative processapproaches (Montuori, 2005). The rationale for this two-part organization, as well as thetype of review this rationale calls for deserve further clarification, before analyzing the historical context of Eurocentrism.¶ Methodological and Theoretical Rationale¶ Conventional literature reviews seek to synthesize ideas as overviews of knowledge to date in order to prefigure further research (Murray & Raths, 1994; Boote & Beile, 2005).Eisenhardt (1998) however, describes another purpose of literature reviews as interpretive tools to “capture insight ….suggesting how and why various contexts and circumstances inform particular meanings and reveal alternative ways of making sense (p. 397).Following Eisenhardt’s description, this unconventional literature review is intended to situate and review an emergent literature on a post-Eurocentric curriculum within an historical analysis of Eurocentrism. A post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon is described that provides an alternative way of making sense of the curriculum literature. Eurocentric modernity is the historical context within which the modern curriculum is conceived. Mostuses of term Eurocentrism within the curriculum literature have yet to include analyses of the origins and meaning of Eurocentrism within the history and project of modernity. This lack of recognition and analysis of the historical context of Eurocentrism contributes to both incoherence and impotency in the use of this critical concept (for examples see Mahalingam, 2000; Gutierrez, 2000; Aikenhead & Lewis, 2001).¶ The concepts Eurocentrism and post-Eurocentrism offer contrasting paradigms through which the curriculum can be evaluated in relation to whether teaching and learning reproduces or decolonizes the dominant modern/colonial system of power/knowledge relations. The successful development and implementation of a post-Eurocentric curriculum is dependent upon an adequate historical-philosophical interpretation of Eurocentrism. As such, this literature review adopts elements from the critical philosophical, interpretive, and creative process approaches (Haggerson, 1991; Eisenhardt,1999; Livingston, 1999; Meacham, 1998; Schwandt, 1998; Montuori, 2005). Eisenhardt describes interpretive reviews as presenting information that “disrupts conventional thinking” and seeks to “reveal alternative ways of making sense” (Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 392, 397). Haggerson’s critical philosophical inquiry attempts to give meaning and enhance understanding of activities and institutions, bringing their norms of governance to consciousness, and finding criteria by which to make appropriate judgments (Haggerson, 1991). Montouri’s creative process model includes problematizing the underlying presuppositions of a field of inquiry along with creating new frameworks for reinterpreting bodies of knowledge (Montouri, 2005). This review does not describe and compare different perspectives. This review instead presents an alternative, post-Eurocentric framework for reinterpreting the modern Eurocentric curriculum, with a specific focus on math and science education. This post-Eurocentric framework provides an alternative way of thinking about school knowledge whereby the entire spectrum of different perspectives can be re-viewed in relation to each other.

#### Policy focus mystifies colonialism and turns debate into regurgitating imperialistic scholarship

**Robinson and Gindin 05** - Jonah Gindin is a Canadian journalist living and working in Caracas, Venezuela, William I Robinson is professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, “The Battle for Global Civil Society,” June 13th 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/20130314033424/http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1186)//A-Berg

\*\*The website this was originally posted on was taken down, but DHeidt managed to find it in the web archive.

But **intellectuals** – who are never free-floating, always attached to the projects of dominant or of subordinate groups—they **have a false consciousness**. Perhaps Gramsci was giving the benefit of the doubt to these intellectuals. There are many respectable and well-intentioned **academics from the “First World**” who unfortunately trumpet the new modalities of U.S. intervention conducted as “democracy promotion,” and others who **deceive themselves**, intentionally or otherwise, **into believing they can participate** intellectually – or directly – **in U.S. political intervention** in order to somehow steer it into a wholesome or acceptable foreign policy. We should recall that intellectual labor is never neutral or divorced from competing and antagonistic social interests. To state this in overly harsh terms, some—perhaps many—academics who defend U.S. “democracy promotion” are organic intellectuals of the transnational elite. Some are outright opportunists who know before whom they need to prostrate themselves in order to secure funding and status in the halls of global power. They are intellectual mercenaries. Others, as I’ve said, are well intentioned. But there is almost always an arrogance of power and privilege that many first world intellectuals bring to their “study” of the global South; there is an **academic colonial mentality** at work. Let’s face it: so-called “democracy promotion” has become a veritable academic industry that has numerous organic, ideological, and funding links with the U.S. intervention apparatus. Let us recall that projects of domination always have their organic intellectuals. The prevailing global order has attracted many **intellectual defenders, academics, pundits, and ideologues**, who in the end serve to **mystify the** real **inner workings of the emerging order** and the social and political interests embedded therein. These **intellectuals have become central cogs in** the system of global capitalist **domination**. Maybe they want a global capitalism with a more “human face,” but in the end they not only help to legitimize this system but also provide technical solutions in response to the problems and contradictions of the system. How can any academic actually follow what the U.S. does around the world in the name of “democracy promotion” and not acknowledge the blatant farce? These are harsh words, but we must ask, what is the role and responsibility of intellectuals in the face of the global crisis, the crisis of civilizational proportions we face in 2005.

#### Metaphors of U.S. benevolence monopolize imperialist representations of Cuba

**Pérez 8** (Louis A., Ph.D. University of New Mexico, Professor of History at University of North Carolina, "Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos," slim\_)

Certainly this had to do with Americans thinking highly of themselves, but it also had to do with an abiding concern to be thought well of by others. In- deed, both were vital to the ways that the Americans came to define and defend their claim to Cuba. The American way to imperialism was inscribed within cultural forms as sources of usable modes of knowledge and deployed by way of metaphorical constructs as usable models of conduct. Cuba entered the American imagination early in the nineteenth century principally by way of metaphor: depictions fashioned as a function of self-interest, almost always in the form of moral imperative in which the exercise of power was represented as the performance of beneficence. It is not that the metaphorical motifs the Americans used to represent Cuba were necessarily original or unique to the United States. On the contrary, the vernacular of empire reaches deeply into the history of colonial narratives. What was different about Cuba, and what will be argued in the pages that follow, was the prominence of metaphor as a mode of North American discourse, which is to say, the prominence of metaphor in the production of knowledge. What was different about Cuba was the degree to which metaphor so utterly displaced alternative cognitive possibilities. Virtually all the metaphors in the stock of imperial tropes were fully aggregated into a single narrative of remarkable endurance-itself evidence of the power of the pathology that was Cuba.

#### Democracy promotion is paternalistic and Eurocentric--provoking resentment and turns the case – this card slays the aff

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From the nineteenth century onward — and Wilson (1901) had already referred to that century as a ‘century of democracy’ — US expansion went together with an emerging narrative that stressed the political significance of ‘self-government’3and ‘democracy’. For Woodrow Wilson, democracy supplies the ‘frank and universal criticism, the free play of individual thought, the open conduct of public affairs, the spirit and pride of community and of cooperation which make governments just and public spirited’ (ibid.: 296). Closely linked into the validation of democracy has been a belief in the importance of self-government and the need to extend it geopolitically. Wilson wrote that it is our task to ‘extend selfgovernment to Porto Rico (sic) and the Philippines, if they be fit to receive it’ (ibid.). This sense of extending self-government and the foundations of democratic politics remained relevant throughout the twentieth century(Robinson, 1996) and in today’s situation we still find a strong emphasis on the US’s perceived need to spread democracy globally. For example, the National Security Strategy for 2006 is founded upon two pillars: (a) to promote freedom, justice and human dignity; and (b) to lead a growing community of democracies. Specifically on democracy, it states that the policy of the US is to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture (The White House, 2006). This support is conditional on the kind of democratic politics encountered, so in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006, the Chávez democratic experiment in Venezuela is characterized as being populist and authoritarian and a source of political and economic instability (Department of Defense, 2006: 28). Notions of spreading self-government and democracy to other worlds were accompanied by subordinating modes of representation. For example, Woodrow Wilson, one of the most interventionist of US Presidents (see Weber, 1995), wrote that the ‘East is to be opened and transformed...the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it; nations and peoples which have stood still...are to be quickened and made part of the universal world of commerce and of ideas’. Furthermore, the US was to ‘teach them order and self-control in the midst of change; impart to them, if it be possible by contact and sympathy and example, the drill and habit of law and obedience’ (Wilson, 1901: 297–8). A sense of sympathy and example was expressed some years later by a State Department instructor who advised new US envoys to Latin America that: if the United States has received but little gratitude, this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor or the policeman, and we have been all three...but it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which...a child looks upon the parent who has molded his character. (Schoultz, 1999: 386). Schoultz goes on to suggest, in his comprehensive investigation of US– Latin American relations, that ‘a belief in Latin American inferiority is the essential core of United States policy toward Latin America because it determines the precise steps the United States takes to protect its interests in the region’ (ibid.: xv).4 This kind of imperial mentality which is deeply rooted in US society, and is also linked internally to the treatment of Native Americans, can be juxtaposed to a dissonant stress on the validity of popular self-determination. In other words it can be suggested that a particular project of imperial power gradually emerged out of an initial anti-colonial struggle for independence from British rule so that such an emergence has given the US a contradictory identity of being a ‘post-colonial imperial power’, with the determining emphasis falling on the ‘imperial’ (Slater, 2004). The post-colonial essentially refers to the specificity of origin and does not preclude the possibility of a coloniality of power, as was exemplified in the case of the Philippines, or (it can be argued) continues to apply to Puerto Rico (Pantojas-Garc´ıa, 2005). Such a paradoxical identity has two important implications. First, one finds juxtaposed an affirmation of the legitimacy of the self-determination of peoples with a belief in the global destiny of the United States. Historically, the contradiction between support for the rights of people to decide their own fate and a belief in the geopolitical destiny of ‘America’ has necessitated a discursive bridge. This bridge has been formed through the invocation of a democratic mission that combines the national and international spheres. In order to go beyond the contradiction between an identity based on the self-determination of peoples and another sedimented in imperial power, a horizon is created for other peoples who are encouraged to choose freedom and democracy, thereby embedding their own struggles within an Americanizing vision and practice.5 Second, the primacy of self-determination provides a key for explaining the dichotomy frequently present in the discourses of US intervention where a distinction is made between a concept of the people and a concept of the rulers. Given the historical differentiation of the New (American) World of freedom, progress and democracy from an Old (European) World of privilege, class and colonial power, support for anti-colonial struggles has been accompanied by a separation between oppressed people and tyrannical rulers. For example, in the case of US hostility towards the Cuban Revolution, the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 makes a clear separation between the Cuban people who need supporting in their vulnerability,6and the Castro government which was portrayed as a tyrannical oppressor of its own people and a security threat to the international community. Similar distinctions have been made in the contexts of interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). Overall, it can be suggested that geopolitical interventions have been couched in terms of a concern for the rights of peoples who are being oppressed by unrepresentative and totalitarian governments. In this context the US is represented as a benevolent guardian of the rights of a subordinated people and an imperial ethic of care is projected across frontiers to provide one form of legitimization for interventions. This particular ethic of care can be seen as an intrinsic feature of the imperial, and although imperial power is certainly anchored in the deployment of force, equally it requires discourses of legitimization wherein ideas of care and guidance continue to play a leading role. Before expanding on questions of legitimization it is necessary to proceed with a kind of ‘geopolitical reality check’ and recall in more detail the nature of US interventions in Latin America, where, in a predominant sense, force and its institutional foundations are clearly manifest. OVERLAPPING FORMS OF INTERVENTION: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE A discussion of the various modalities of US intervention is always needed not only to counter the official narratives of governmental truth but also as part of our attempt to nurture an alternative geopolitics of memory which, inter alia, returns the gaze on to the violence of sanctioned power. For Latin America, it is possible to identify six types of intervention which, taken together, have formed the building blocks of a generalized strategy of penetrating power.7 Terminating Elected Governments In contrast to the repeated argument that the West, and especially the United States, has been responsible for the diffusion of democracy to the Third World, it needs to be recalled that the United States has intervened to close down democratic governments that have sought to develop policies that were independent of US power. In 1954 in Guatemala, a CIA-backed coup overthrew the democratically elected government of Arbenz, who had initiated a programme of land reform which was strongly opposed by the United Fruit Company. The US preferred the installation of a military regime to the possibility of a reforming, redistributing government acting as a possible example for other Latin American societies. The coup initiated a forty-year period of state terror, death squads, torture, disappearances and executions with an estimated 200,000 deaths (see, for example,Cullather,1999;Grandin, 2004).Other interventions took place in 1965 in the Dominican Republic and in Chile in 1973 where a vibrant democratic government was replaced by the US-backed Pinochet dictatorship. In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinista government which had won an election in 1984 — an election which was judged by independent observers to be fair and legitimate (Cornelius, 1986), was destabilized by the Reagan Administration and subsequently lost the 1990 elections. Transgressions of National Sovereignty Such transgressions, which have not entailed the over throw of democratically elected governments are exemplified by such cases as Cuba in 1961, with the unsuccessful US-planned Bay of Pigs invasion, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. In the Panamanian example, the US invasion was codenamed ‘Operation Just Cause’ and its primary objectives were to ‘defend democracy in Panama’ and ‘combat drug trafficking’. In thirteen hours, more than 400 bombs were dropped by US war planes with an estimated 4,000 civilian deaths and over 50,000 people left homeless (Boggs, 2005: 180–1). In the case of Grenada, the Reagan Administration justified its invasion in relation to article 6 of the Rio Pact of 1947 which, it claimed, legitimized intervention when regional security was threatened by an extra-continental conflict or by any other situation that might endanger the peace of America. The US acted unilaterally in accordance with its own strategic imperatives and failed to convene a meeting of the Organization of American States as was required by article 6 of the Rio treaty. Support for Dictatorships The termination of independent, democratic governments and the transgression of national sovereignty have had their reverse side — a historical record of support for pro-Western dictatorships. In South America, military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were not destabilized and undermined but rather supported. For example, in the case of the 1964 military coup in Brazil, the United States provided up to US $1.5 billion in financial support during the regime’s first four years (Kolko, 1988:159). In Argentina, the US gave support to the Argentinian military in their treatment of dissent, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in conversation with the Argentinian Foreign Minister in 1976, noting that, ‘if there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly...but you must get back quickly to normal procedures’ (McPherson, 2006: 160–1). In the case of Chile, US support for Pinochet is well-known, and Kissinger commented on the Allende government that ‘I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people’ (quoted in Schoultz, 1987: 284). Assassinations A more targeted and covert form of intervention has been that of the CIA policy of assassinations which was made illegal in 1976 only to be re-activated by President Bush in the wake of 9/11. Blum (2000) has indicated that from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s there were over forty recorded incidents of assassination plots, largely aimed at Third World leaders. In the single case of Fidel Castro, official US records have shown that the CIA launched at least eight attempts on the Cuban leader’s life in the 1960s, including attempted shootings and bombings, lethal pills and on one notorious occasion, an exploding cigar (for some details see Tisdall, 2007: 18). Disregard for International Law The policy of assassinations can be interpreted within the wider framework of a disregard for and violation of international law. The more than forty-year blockade of Cuba stands as one example of such a disregard: the strategy has been condemned by the UN, the European Union and the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which has ruled that the trade embargo against Cuba violates international law (see Chomsky, 2000: 2). In the case of US support for the contras in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the International Court of Justice in The Hague found the United States guilty of violating both international law and its treaty obligations to Nicaragua. The Court ordered Washington to stop its intervention and negotiate a reparations settlement with Nicaragua. However, after winning the 1990 elections, the US-backed government of Chamorro, under pressure from Washington, withdrew the lawsuit, the costs of which had risen to US$ 17 billion, and subsequently Washington forgave US$ 260 million in loans to Nicaragua (Holden and Zolov, 2000: 300–1). Other examples of a disregard for international law are reflected in the use of US-defined powers of extra-territorial jurisdiction (see Slater, 2004: Ch. 7) and in a reluctance to abide by international treaty obligations, as argued in the American Journal of International Law, 1998 (quoted in Chomsky, 2000: 216). More recently, the use of the naval base at Guantánamo Bay for the detainment without trial of so-called ‘unlawful combatants’ constitutes a breach of the Geneva Conventions (Rose,2004). Counter Insurgency Training: School of the Americas Based inside the United States, the activities of the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Co-operation, have a history that is relevant to geopolitical interventionism. Located at Fort Benning in Georgia the School has, since it was founded in 1946, trained more than 60,000 soldiers and police, mostly from Latin America, in counter-insurgency skills. In a recent investigation, Gill (2004) shows how the School’s institutionalization of state-sponsored violence was a key pillar in the US’s support for military rule in Latin America. Seven US Army training manuals used by the School between 1989 and 1991 were declassified in 1996; they provided instruction on the detection and suppression of anti-government political and military activities, and also contained information indicating how the US Army trained Latin American military and police officers in a variety of interrogation techniques.8It is important to recall that SOA graduates have led a number of military coups, and as Blum (2000) notes, what has also been documented is evidence of the training by the US Army of Latin American military and police personnel in the skills of institutionalized terror. These six overlapping facets of geopolitical intervention provide a glimpse of an alternative reality to the official narrative surrounding the role of the United States in the world, past and present. They can provide a source of critical analysis which brings the ‘dark side’ of North–South encounters into sharper focus. They underline the invasive effects of imperial power and help subvert the image of a beneficent America; but analytically, although they might concentrate the mind, they are not sufficient. POWER AND DEMOCRACY: A CLASH OF INTERPRETATIONS The desire to penetrate another society and help reorder that other society is a key part of the imperial project. In general imperialism may be defined in terms of the strategy, practice and advocacy of the penetrative power of a Western state over other predominantly non-Western societies, whose political sovereignty is thereby subverted. The word ‘predominantly’ is used here since I would argue that imperialism, or more specifically US imperialism, while having potentially dominating effects on other Western nation-states, is most clearly manifest in the context of West–non-West relations. The penetrative power of imperialism goes together with a determination to impose a set of institutions and values on to the imperialized society — for example, to ‘impose democracy’ (Ferguson,2005:52)—and this imposition is rooted in a lack of respect and recognition for the society being penetrated. The geopolitical will to intervene resides with the agents of power working in and through the apparatuses of the imperial state. The processes of legitimization for that will to power are produced both within the state and in civil society. In the case of the United States and its relations with the societies of the Latin South the processes of legitimization have been particularly significant in supporting its power and hegemonic ambition. Concretely in this context the aim of diffusing democracy or a specific interpretation of democracy has been and remains a key element in the justification of geopolitical power. The appeal and impact of the democratic US political system has been accompanied by an entrepreneurial economic model which emphasizes global free trade and the benefits of competition. In this sense it can be suggested that the US exports a neoliberal democratic model which represents one form of democratic politics. For Brzezinski (1997), given the fact that the US is both a globally hegemonic power and a democracy, one can pose the question of whether the projection of American democracy is compatible with a ‘quasi-imperial responsibility’. More acutely, one can suggest that democracy has an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ so that dominating power at home can lead to the corrosion of the democratic ethos that helps to sustain the consensuality of hegemonic power, whilst the intensive deployment of what Nye (2002) has called ‘hard power’ can undermine the seductiveness of the democratic promise abroad. War and militarization, together with transgressions of international law, are inimical to the health of democratic politics in general, as well as being a source for the undermining of the US-made image of democracy for export, an image which Fukuyama (2006) has called the US’s ‘benevolent hegemony’ for spreading democracy globally. In her discussion of a terrorized and privatized democracy, Eisenstein (2007) gives us a different picture. She shows in detail how the ‘war on terror’ has led to a severe erosion of democracy with the rise of an excessive and extremist politics, as is seen in White House memos on torture. Human Rights Watch documents the continual circumvention of law in the treatment of prisoners and detainees in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and in Abu Ghraib. ‘Humiliation and degradation as well as coercive interrogation are now permissible; the Commander-in-Chief is not bound by international laws; offshore and undisclosed and off-limits sites are created in which to detain terror suspects’ (Eisenstein, 2007: 54). In addition to this demise of a democratic spirit, one can point to a number of egregious contradictions concerning US foreign policy. For example, the United States justifies war for the purposes of removing weapons of mass destruction whilst holding the largest nuclear arsenal in the world; it ignores the will of the Security Council on the grounds that another nation has ignored the will of the Security Council; it threatens consequences for those who contravene the Geneva Convention, while insisting that this convention does not apply to those prisoners it holds in Guantánamo Bay; and whilst it argues for the importance of a respect for international law, it organizes the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of terrorist suspects who have no recourse to the due process s of international law. But it can be argued that rather than see these dissonances as contradictions one can posit that they reveal a logic of exception, rooted in the assumed power of a ‘global sovereign’. Thus, as Ross (2004: 26) suggests, in spite of demanding respect for the law, the global sovereign always reserves the right to act outside this law in exceptional circumstances, just as it reserves the prerogative to decide when circumstances are exceptional, as, for example, in its declaration of a war on terror in the wake of 9/11. As the exceptional power, as the guarantor of world security, US action is assured of its propriety. This also helps to explain the US perspective on exporting democracy. In the official narrative of bringing democracy to the world there is a hidden assumption that the US has the right, under circumstances chosen by the global sovereign, to spread democracy to others through the use of force. For Ross (2004: 41), ‘democratic imperialism is the claim that a democratic state has some kind of duty, as a citizen of the world, to act with the goal of ending non-democratic governments everywhere’. This is a relevant point but equally we must remember that whilst force has been used, ‘democratic imperialism’ requires a more subtle and multi-dimensional legitimization. This includes the idea that democracy is being called for, or in other words that democracy US-style is being invited by peoples yearning for freedom. Rather than democracy being imposed, it is suggested that the US is responding to calls from other societies to be democratized, so that through a kind of cellular multiplication, a US model can be gradually introduced; the owners will be the peoples of other cultures, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, who will find ways of adapting the US template to their own circumstances. What is being proposed here is a kind of ‘viral democracy’ whereby the politics of guidance is merged into a politics of benign adaptation. President Bush has expressed this idea quite clearly, noting that the US’s faith in freedom and democracy is now ‘a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations’. ‘Our democratic faith’, he goes on, ‘is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along’ (quoted in Gardner, 2005: 25). At the same time, it is a specific form of democratic rule that is being projected and alternative models that include a critique of US power and attempts to introduce connections with popular sovereignty and new forms of socialism are singled out for disapproval — the Chávez government being a clear example. In the post-9/11 period, the ‘war on terror’, with its erosion of civil liberties, violation of human rights and overall diffusion of a politics of fear, has undermined the effectiveness of a benevolent image of US democracy for export. Neoliberal democracy as the universal model has come to be associated more with a bellicose unilateralism than with a seductive template for political adaptation. Here we have a key limit on the potential of US power, as ‘anti-American’ sentiment is deepened. Moreover, other democratic imaginations emanating from Latin America have been offering vibrant alternatives to the US model. Whilst the centrality of US imperial power is being challenged, there is an amplification of democratic politics (Slater, 2006). In the context of US– Latin American relations the mission to universalize a US model of democracy is being contested by a wide range of social movements and political forces. The promotion of democracy from above is being actively called into question in a continent impatient at being framed as the passive recipient. For democracy to flourish, it has to be home-grown and autonomously sustained, not exported as part of a legitimization of subordinating power. The imperative to ‘democratize’, just like the injunction to ‘globalize’, creates an asymmetry between those announcing the imperative and those subjected to it, between those who ‘democratize’ and those who are ‘democratized’. When the imperial and the democratic are brought together, a series of irresolvable tensions and contradictions emerge. The imperial relation entails, as we have briefly discussed above, processes of penetration and imposition, processes which the Woodrow Wilson perspective, for example, clearly shows are anchored in a Western ethnocentrism. Such an imperial relation requires a discourse of justification and it is here that the promise of democracy assumes a key relevance. However, the effectiveness of a democratic promise is continually subverted by the subordinating practices of the actual deployment of imperial power. Similarly, the vibrant process of democratization, in the sense of the renewal of the forms of participation, as reflected in the will and capacity of social subjects to be self-reflexive and critical of governmental authority, will always transcend democracy as a fixed system of political rule, and especially so when such a system is introduced from outside.

#### Market liberalization causes mass inequality, destroys value to life, and perpetuates North-South violence

**Mignolo 05** - professor of Literature at Duke (Walter D, Blackwell Publishing, “The Idea of Latin America,” 2005, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1371668124435.pdf) //RGP

Among the stated goals of the FTAA is the liberalization of trade to generate economic growth and improve the quality of life. Nothing is said about equity in distribution. All the goals emphasize growth and increases (like the increase of the levels of trade in good and services). Nothing is said about the fact that the “increase” means capital accumulation, not the improvement of quality of life for the totality of the population. The agreement states that one of its goals is to enhance competition among its parties. Yet, again, nothing is said about the fact that the goal of competition is capital accumulation for the strongest, since actors in the economic games are ruled by the principle of individuality and disregard (or exploit to personal gain) the community of people. The goals also purport to eliminate barriers among the parties. But those parties do not begin with equal conditions; so the elimination of barriers favors the centers of industrial and technological production and ﬁnancial accumulation. No mention is made of the fact that the elimination of “barriers” in economic trades is parallel to the enforcement of the “frontiers” to keep immigrants from entering from the South. Each goal only tells half of the story. Either those who are in the position of formulating and implementing global designs are blind, and truly believe their own rhetoric of development as the improvement of people around the world, or they are using that rhetoric to cover a lie. Whoever pays attention to the history of the world in the past thirty or so years will understand the implications of each of these goals and know that they imply the increasing marginalization of the majority of the world’s population, and the decrease in their quality of life and decent living conditions.

#### Economic development perpetuates the commodification of the environment and North-South divide making violence inevitable

**Howard, Hume, and Oslender 07** (\*David Howard – PhD in Latin America Studies from the University of Oxford; he is a lecturer in Sustainable Urban Development at the University of Oxford, \*\*Mo Hume – PhD in Latin American studies from the University of Liverpool; she is a professor of Development and Latin American Politics (Department of Politics) at the University of Glasgow, and \*\*\*Ulrich Oslender – PhD in Hispanic Studies from the University of Glasgow; former research fellow at the University of Glasgow in the Department of Geography, November 2007, “Violence, fear, and development in Latin America: a critical overview”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25548278.pdf) //MD

Others, however, have criticised 'Mrs Brundtland's disenchanted cosmos' and the fact that sustainable development is still based on the capitalisation of nature, expressed through global views on nature and environment by those who rule, instead of through local respect for surrounding landscapes (Visvanathan 1991). And Sachs (1992) argues in his widely read Development Dictionary that notions of ecology are merely reduced to higher efficiency, while a development framework is still accepted as the norm. Visvanathan (1991: 384) calls for an 'explosion of imaginations' as a form of resistance to this dominant economism and essentially violent development framework: a call echoed by Peet and Watts (1996: 263-8) in their edited collection on 'liberation ecologies', which envisages 'environmental imaginaries' as primary sites of contestation, which are then articulated by social movements that contest normative visions and the 'imperialism of the imaginary'. In many ways, the very notion of development has been radically called into question, as the concept has been linked to neo-colonial intentions of the Global North to intervene in and keep control of the countries in the Global South. For Escobar (1995: 159), dominant development discourse portrays the so-called 'third world' as a space devoid of knowledge, a 'chronic pathological condition', so that the Western scientist ‘like a good doctor, has the moral obligation to intervene in order to cure the diseased (social) body'. This intervention is always a violent one: one that ruptures the cultural fabric, penetrates the colonised body, and inserts a homogeneous developmental reasoning, often extirpating resistant cultural difference. To break this cycle of violent developmentalism, Escobar (1995) calls for an era of 'post-development' as a necessary step for national projects of decolonisation and for the affirmation of truly emancipatory political projects of self-affirmation.

#### Their heg advantage relies on cultural and epistemic binaries that legitimize structures of violence.

**Taylor 12** - Lecturer in Latin American Studies BA University of London, Queen Mary MPhil University of Glasgow PhD University of Manchester, (Lucy, “Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America,” International Studies Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, 11 SEP 2012, 14, 386–400, Wiley Online Library)//A-Berg

My decolonial approach involves revealing the operation of coloniality⁄modernity, and this leads me to recognize and destabilize two intertwined binaries that have helped to generate the status of the United States in its position of global powerfulness. This position is of course determined by the US’ economic dominance and military might, but also its standing in the global arena is conditioned by its image as a coherent and progressive nation. This image calls on (at least) two **dialogues of othering**, which are configured through coloniality and respond to hierarchies of knowledge and race: firstly, ‘‘domestic’’ coloniality and the Native American other; secondly, ‘‘international’’ coloniality and the Latin American other. Revealing the operation of coloniality serves to problematize the naturalness of these ‘‘American’’ hierarchies and unsettles our image of the USA, opening ways to contest its superiority. Here, I am adopting the strategy of provincialization advocated by Nayak and Selbin, but I am not proposing to provincialize from a very different epistemological position (as Chakrabarty (2000) did with reference to Europe and India, for example) but from a place that offers many similarities. These similarities stem from their shared place in the development of modernity⁄coloniality and capitalism, their social and cultural roots in the colonial encounter, and the ongoing dynamics of racial and epistemological inequality. Viewing the USA from a perspective which begins in the long sixteenth century allows us to reveal and disrupt binaried thinking and question global hierarchies; that this involves rethinking the USA makes it of primary relevance for a decolonial IR. From a coloniality of power perspective embedded in contemporary Latin America, the most obvious binary which contributes to US dominance is the Native/settler binary. The USA was constructed through a process in which the superiority of northern European settler people and their worldviews was asserted over Native American societies. This took the form of on-going territorial, economic, and **epistemological conquest** over Native peoples throughout the period, but perhaps the most formative experience, according to Shari Huhndorf, was the drive West in the nineteenth century (2001). This pivotal moment of struggle and national myth formation consolidated the US nationstate in terms of territory, migration, and economic expansion, as well as solidifying its national identity (Huhndorf 2001: 19–64; Bender 2006: 193–241). The colonial project of western expansion was characterized by **massacres**, displacement, and deception, which decimated Native communities and asserted the settlers’ military, political, and epistemological dominance (D’Errico 2001). As land was settled, the country became subdued and the enclosure of Native Americans in Reservations served to confirm the hegemonic dominance of a nationstate, which could set the terms of limited Native autonomy (Ostler 2004). Moreover, the mythology of the White pioneer who built ranches and towns in the wilderness attempted to displace the Native peoples from their status of original Americans (Agnew and Sharp 2002; Wolfe 2006). This domination was territorial but also epistemic and ethnic, then, and the success, coherence, and completeness of political domination and ethnic silencing played a direct role in generating a coherent and complete vision of ‘‘America’’. Thus, and in the words of Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893, ‘‘Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American’’ (quoted in Huhndorf 2005: 56). This dominance was confirmed by the capacity of US culture to appropriate Native imagery and practices in a wide range of scenarios from the movies to Scouting via World Fairs and fashion (Huhndorf 2001: 19–78, 162–202). Native Americans have never ceased to resist this onslaught and to express the agonies of the colonial wound and the fresh imaginaries of the colonial difference (Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Tyeeme Clark and Powell 2008), but the ‘‘success’’ of the American Dream made for the dominance of the hegemonic settler culture (Churchill 1997). The second dynamic of coloniality which has helped to generate US powerfulness was the emergence of the north/south binary, hinged at the US–Mexico border zone, with its economic, political, and racial dynamics. This binary developed particularly in the nineteenth century as the USA emerged to powerfulness but it is rooted in colonial rivalries. The colonial heritage of Latin America was derived mostly from a Catholic and southern Spanish empire, which during the long sixteenth century lost spiritual and political power in Europe to the protestant north, led by the British (who went on to become the pre-eminent colonial power). The conquistadores were branded with the ‘‘Black Legend’’ of Spanish colonialism by an emerging intelligentsia who painted themselves as enlightened bringers of progress, in contrast to the despotic, violent, lazy, and exploitative Spanish (Powell 1971: 39–59; Weber 2005: 2). In the USA, they chose to overlook the century of Spanish colonization of the North, and popular histories came to mark the birth of ‘‘America’’ with the arrival of the English Pilgrim Fathers on the Mayflower (Horwitz 2009). This sense of superiority linked to a British colonial heritage was compounded by perceived racial inferiority of Latin American elites who were descended from ‘‘darker’’ Europeans to the south and presided over countries with large indigenous and mestizo (mixed-heritage) populations (Leys Stepan 1991: 45; Goldberg 2009). The superiority of a ‘‘White’’ and protestant USA seemed to be confirmed by the contrasting fortunes of South and North America: While Spain fell to Napoleonic rule and lost most of its colonies during the 1810s, the expanding USA acquired Louisiana (1812), Florida (1819) and New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, and sections of Colorado (1848)––much of it formerly under Spanish rule (Mignolo 2005: 49–82). An ascendant USA took up the role of regional policeman expressed through the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, donning the mantle of Western supremacism which was being exercised by the Old World powers across Africa and Asia. The United States went on to take possession of the Philippines in 1898 and intensified its interest in Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, and Cuba, among others, at the same time. The economic benefits which accrued from such a role were, of course, also very significant (Robinson 1996; Livingstone 2009). This policing role was expanded by the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, which staked the United States’ claim to be a global actor, a claim which was reinforced by interventionist foreign policy actions across the region (Ryan 2000: 40–54; Murphy 2005). From an angle which foregrounds coloniality and the powerfulness of racial– epistemic hierarchies, then, the rise of the USA to global powerfulness occurs in dialogue with countries to the south which were understood to be racially inferior and economically fair game for an expanding USA which sought to protect and enhance its interests (Ryan 2000: 1–10). Thus, Latin America is a crucial site for launching the US’ career as a global agent, economic powerhouse, norm advocate, and keeper of ‘‘the peace,’’ a site which is framed by dynamics of race and colonialism. Understanding US powerfulness demands, then, that IR take seriously not only its economic imperialism and interventionist bullying, but the coloniality of that power relationship, replete with epistemological and racial dimensions. Indeed, taking seriously the coloniality of power implies asking how its domestic and international dimensions are linked. By looking beyond the confines of ‘‘domestic’’ and ‘‘international,’’ we can perceive continuities in the exercise of coloniality and the operation the European epistemic project. For example, Huhndorf argues that the completion of the westward expansion and ‘‘solution’’ of the Indian Problem spelled trouble for a US identity that was made vivid through conquest. Sustaining and building that identity (and the economic and geopolitical power which was accrued by the expropriation of land) required that new frontiers be breached, which could recreate the energizing effects of dominating the barbarian (Huhndorf 2005: 61–4). It was in this spirit, she argues, that the United States took possession of the Philippines and intensified its interest in Central America and the Caribbean. In this way, the practice of coloniality by the US settler elite shifted southwards and took on imperial dimensions.

**Their rhetoric of failed states and spheres of influence reifies an imperialistic approach to Latin America.**

**Slater 10** - Professor in the Department of Geography at Loughborough University, (David Rethinking the Imperial Difference: towards an understanding of US–Latin American encounters Third World Quarterly Volume 31, Issue 2, 07 Apr 2010, Taylor & Francis)//A-Berg

Terms such as the North–South divide, and centre–periphery relations are constructs which reflect a posited distinction between two sets of countries within the international system. More fundamentally one can suggest that this difference is anchored in imperial power—that the imperial difference is the difference between imperial societies and imperialised societies; and, despite the complex heterogeneities existing within both categories, there is a profound asymmetrical relation that is rooted in a history of power and knowledge. This relation has not been transcended—we do not live in a post-imperial world—and the imperial nature of power continues to affect and insinuate itself into a range of social, political and cultural phenomena. It is an imperial mentality which can be traced through a lineage of invasiveness and penetration, of the imposition of the values and organisational forms of the imperialising society on to the imperialised society, of a violation of political sovereignty, of an erasure or belittling of the other's sense of indigenous cultural value, of a subordinating mode of representation, encapsulated in such notions as ‘**traditional society’, ‘failed’ or ‘rogue state’, and ‘emerging economy’**, and in an overarching assumption of guidance, authority and leadership. Within this context **the West is seen as special**—the home of reason, human rights, democracy, self-reflexivity—and this special-ness is interpreted as having been achieved in an independent fashion without the need of learning from inter-cultural encounters.69 In this vision the geopolitics of knowledge is centred on the West and **the non-West is depicted as inferior**, in need of tutelage and constant supervision: as Césaire put it over 50 years ago, ‘the West alone knows how to think … at the borders of the Western world there begins the shadowy realm of primitive thinking, which, dominated by the notion of participation, incapable of logic, is the very model of faulty thinking’.70 The posited inability of the non-West to think in terms that might be globally relevant and to have the capacity to be an independent agent can be briefly illustrated through reference to two examples from **the history of US–Latin American relations.** First, in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, a series of scholarly meetings was set up in the late 1980s to bring together the key participants in the crisis. It was not until the third such meeting that Cuban representatives were even invited and then only at Soviet insistence. US representatives resisted Cuban participation on the grounds that this would turn the meeting into a ‘political circus’.71 It emerged from these meetings that the crisis could not end until Castro permitted the missiles to be removed, in exchange for a Soviet brigade to defend Cuba. Cuba was not recognised as an important actor in the crisis by the US representatives; moreover Cuba was seen, in general, as not being capable of rational decision making. Second, in President Reagan's address to the nation on the situation in Nicaragua, broadcast in March 1986, one encounters a related framing of a geopolitical issue. Reagan introduced the topic of the address by stating that there was a ‘mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States … I'm speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only two hours’ flying time from our own borders’.72 Having established the existence of a severe danger and its proximity to the US, Reagan went on to argue that the threat came not so much from Nicaragua itself but from the fact that its territory was being used by the Soviet enemy, the ‘evil Empire’. The Sandinistas were subsumed under the label of Soviet-bloc communists and their Nicaraguan collaborators. Reagan went on to state that the Soviets, together with the Sandinistas, must not be permitted to ‘crush freedom’ in Central America, and ‘threaten our own security on our own doorstep’. Overall, what happens here is that the Sandinistas are shorn of independent agency; they are depicted as being manipulated by an external and tyrannical power—**they do not possess their own agency**, and are not able to decide independently their own path to development. At the time, García Márquez singled out this relational proclivity, arguing that within the US there was a widespread tendency to believe that Latin American peoples were not able to think for themselves and be independent of the two blocs, West and East. If a Latin American government was acting independently this must have meant that it was being manipulated by an external power. Conclusions This is very much a ‘work in progress’, being constrained by the limitations of space, and any conclusions must be seen as tentative and provisional. The way I have been trying to analyse the geopolitics of imperial power in a context of US–Latin American relations owes a good deal to approaches that do not marginalise the insights of political economy perspectives, but attempt to open up new multifaceted pathways for critical discussion, seen broadly in a post-structuralist, and post- or de-colonial framework.73 I have argued that, in the case of the US, the imperial mentality is deeply rooted in society, and affects all spheres of social and political life. It is partly driven by economic imperatives, but crucially needs to be understood in the arena of state–society relations, and especially within the ambit of the state, where the agents of power construct and deploy imperial policies. The desire to penetrate, invade and restructure another society is concentrated into a political will that gives expression to the varied compulsions working inside the imperial society. Capacities are developed to enact this will and modes of justification are set in train to support the imperial drive. In the US and other Western societies the imperial drive has never been confronted in a comprehensive manner and the key facets of the imperial character continue to flow through the political veins of Western society. When it is remarked that the reaction to 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib express violent entailments of imperial history, and that they are at once anachronistic and geopolitically resonant, it is as if they are both ‘boldly new and disturbingly the same’.74

#### Their discursive construction of a “China threat” makes war inevitable

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I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides.

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#### Biotech independently solves bioterrorism

**Bailey, 1** [Ronald, award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine and Reason.com, where he writes a weekly science and technology column. Bailey is the author of the book Liberation Biology: The Moral and Scientific Case for the Biotech Revolution (Prometheus, 2005), and his work was featured in The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2004. In 2006, Bailey was shortlisted by the editors of Nature Biotechnology as one of the personalities who have made the "most significant contributions" to biotechnology in the last 10 years. 11/7/1, “The Best Biodefense,” Reason, <http://reason.com/archives/2001/11/07/the-best-biodefense>]

But Cipro and other antibiotics are just a small part of the arsenal that could one day soon be deployed in defending America against biowarfare. Just consider what’s in the pipeline now that could be used to protect Americans against infectious diseases, including bioterrorism. A Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Research Association survey found 137 new medicines for infectious diseases in drug company research and development pipelines, including 19 antibiotics and 42 vaccines. With regard to anthrax, instead of having to rush a sample to a lab where it takes hours or even days to culture, biotech companies have created test strips using antibody technologies that can confirm the presence of anthrax in 15 minutes or less, allowing decontamination and treatment to begin immediately. Similar test strips are being developed for the detection of smallpox as well. The biotech company EluSys Therapeutics is working on an exciting technique which would "implement instant immunity." EluSys joins two monoclonal antibodies chemically together so that they act like biological double-sided tape. One antibody sticks to toxins, viruses, or bacteria while the other binds to human red blood cells. The red blood cells carry the pathogen or toxin to the liver for destruction and return unharmed to the normal blood circulation. In one test, the EluSys treatment reduced the viral load in monkeys one million-fold in less than an hour. The technology could be applied to a number of bioterrorist threats, such as dengue fever, Ebola and Marburg viruses, and plague. Of course, the EluSys treatment would not just be useful for responding to bioterrorist attacks, but also could treat almost any infection or poisoning. Further down the development road are technologies that could rapidly analyze a pathogen’s DNA, and then guide the rapid synthesis of drugs like the ones being developed by EluSys that can bind, or disable, segments of DNA crucial to an infectious organism's survival. Again, this technology would be a great boon for treating infectious diseases and might be a permanent deterrent to future bioterrorist attacks. Seizing Bayer’s patent now wouldn’t just cost that company and its stockholders a little bit of money (Bayer sold $1 billion in Cipro last year), but would reverberate throughout the pharmaceutical research and development industry. If governments begin to seize patents on the pretext of addressing alleged public health emergencies, the investment in research that would bring about new and effective treatments could dry up. Investors and pharmaceutical executives couldn’t justify putting $30 billion annually into already risky and uncertain research if they couldn’t be sure of earning enough profits to pay back their costs. Consider what happened during the Clinton health care fiasco, which threatened to impose price controls on prescription drugs in the early 1990s: Growth in research spending dropped off dramatically from 10 percent annually to about 2 percent per year. A far more sensible and farsighted way to protect the American public from health threats, including bioterrorism, is to encourage further pharmaceutical research by respecting drug patents. In the final analysis, America’s best biodefense is a vital and profitable pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.

#### Biotech key to heg

**Engdahl, 5** (William, “Seeds of Destruction: The Geopolitics of GM Food,” 3/6/2005, http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2005/Geopolitics-GM-Food6mar05.htm)   
In June 2003, President George W. Bush made the issue of lifting an 8-year European Union ban on genetically modified (GM) plants a matter of US national strategic priority. This came only days after the US occupation of Baghdad. The timing was not accidental. Since that time, EU resistance to GM plants has crumbled, as has that of Brazil, and other key agriculture producing nations. One year before, the future of GM crops was in doubt.  
Now, some months and enormous pressure later, the strategists of GM food hegemony are on the verge of a control over the global human and animal food chain never held by any single nation or power.  
The present debate over the nature of biotechnology and genetic modification of basic food such as maize or soybeans, misses the most essential point. The conversion of world agriculture by a small elite of biotech companies, most US-based, has little to do with corporate greed. It has very much to do with geopolitics and plans of some people to control world population growth over the coming decades.  
The nature of American power projection in the world today rests on the development of key strategic advantages which no other combination of nations can challenge, what the Pentagon planners term, "full spectrum dominance." This includes global military dominance. It includes dominance of the world's limited, and rapidly depleting petroleum supplies. It includes control of the world's reserve currency, the dollar. And today it most definitely includes future control of world agriculture through control of GM patents and GM crops.  
Before the end of the decade, if present trends continue, US global dominance will be based on control of the food supply of most of this planet, far more than military or even energy control. The geopolitical dimension of this prospect bears careful examination.

#### Reform key to competitiveness and econ

**Trujillo and Melgoza 13**

Mr. Trujillo is chairman of the Trujillo Group, LLC and co-chairman of the Latino Donor Collaborative. Mr. Melgoza is the CEO of Geoscape International Inc. The Economic—and Demographic—Case for Immigration Reform, 2/21/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323951904578290471589119346.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

Since the November election, there has been much talk in Washington and on the pundit circuit about America's changing demographics, especially the "Latino vote" and the new realities of political campaigning. There has also been considerable wrangling over immigration and what it means for a country that is a nation of immigrants but is more crowded than it once was.¶ The immigration debate is significant to America's politics and culture, but it is also crucial to the country's economics, a subject that receives too little attention. Let's be blunt: The future wealth and well-being of the American people—the country's economic security, national security, business innovation, GDP growth and status in the global marketplace—require a comprehensive solution to the chronic problems caused by a broken immigration policy. In particular, the status of 11 million unauthorized Latino immigrants now living here must be resolved.¶ The economics are simple: Latinos spur demand. Seventy percent of the nation's gross domestic product is fueled by consumer spending. That means the Latino population—large, growing and increasingly prosperous—will play a key role in America's economic future.¶ Latinos are now by far the country's biggest minority-market segment. Including unauthorized residents, the Latino population now exceeds 54 million (not counting nearly four million in Puerto Rico). Blacks, in second place, number 39 million. The Latino population has increased by more than 52% since 2000. In the same period, the non-Latino white population grew less than 2% and blacks by 14%.¶ According to U.S. Census forecasts, the Latino population in America will reach 133 million by 2050. Those 133 million American Latinos will outnumber the populations of Japan and Russia, whose numbers are already in decline.¶ With growing numbers comes more spending: Latino purchasing power now exceeds $1.2 trillion and, according to the University of Georgia's Selig Center, will top $1.5 trillion by 2015. From a global perspective, that means America's Latino market would be the 11th-largest economy in the world—just below France, Italy and Mexico, and above South Korea, Spain and Indonesia. At $20,400 per capita, Latino America's purchasing power already exceeds the GDP per capita of all four BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China.¶ But Latinos' beneficial economic effect is hardly restricted to the demand side. A vital element of supply-side health is labor—workers, from the most talented who invent new products or start a business, to those just beginning to climb the ladder of self-improvement, whether through formal education or on-the-job training.¶ Nearly one in six American workers (16%) is Latino, with nearly 23 million Latinos in the U.S. holding jobs. You might not know it from media coverage of immigration issues, but Latinos have the highest labor-force participation rate (nearly 67%) of any American demographic group.¶ Slightly more than a quarter of children in the U.S. under age 18 are Latino. Based on existing trends, at least 1.1 million Latino youths will turn 18 each year for the next 20 years. Politicians may see 1.1 million new voters a year, but business owners see 1.1 million new workers with a strong work ethic. Given the aging of the country's baby boom generation—retiring at the rate of 10,000 a day for the next 18 years—the strength of the economy is increasingly linked to the promise of these younger workers.¶ Dire demographics threaten the economies in many developed nations, and the U.S. is not immune to the challenges posed by an aging population. But the problem will be considerably mitigated by immigrants who revitalize the workforce. The average later-life American, whose life expectancy nearly doubled during the 20th century, is already asking: Who is going to pay for the Social Security and Medicare promises of the federal government?¶ The answer: America's expanding, youthful immigrant population—another reason why ensuring educational opportunities at every level for all residents is in the national interest.¶ Getting the U.S. economy moving again requires action on many fronts: tax and regulatory reform, new approaches to energy, education and health care. But nothing is more important than immigration reform. Despite the impression left by much of the rhetoric in Washington, immigration reform is not just about politics. It's about jobs, growth and competitiveness—economic security, which in turn means national security.¶ To achieve these benefits, immigration policies and practices must be attuned to welcoming hardworking immigrants and to dealing fairly and smartly with those who are already in the U.S. regardless of their legal status. Legal immigration, including a guest-worker program that will bolster American business productivity, should be expanded in an intelligent way that is pro-investment and pro-growth. U.S. borders need to be secured against further illegal immigration.¶ Washington must send a clear signal—to the American people and to every level of government—that a coherent and enforceable immigration policy is in place and here to stay.

#### a) continued pressure on Boehner

**Sullivan 10/24**

Sean, Washington Post, The Fix, John Boehner’s next big test: Immigration, 10/24/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/10/24/john-boehners-next-big-test-immigration-reform/

The policy imperative already exists for some House Republicans — perhaps enough of them that if Boehner allowed a vote, reform of some type could pass with a majority of House Democrats and a minority of House Republicans, as did last week’s deal to end the government shutdown and raise the debt ceiling. (What specifically could pass and whether Obama could accept it is another question.)¶ What’s not clear is whether Boehner would be willing to chart a path with less than majority GOP support again so soon after the last time and without his back against the wall as it was in the fiscal standoff.¶ This much we know: The White House and Senate Democrats will keep applying pressure on Boehner to act on immigration. Obama’s remarks are the latest example of his plan. The speaker will be feeling external and internal pressure to move ahead on immigration.¶ But he will also feel pressure from conservatives to oppose it. Here’s the thing, though: Boehner listened to the right flank of his conference in the fiscal fight, and that path was politically destructive for his party. That’s enough to believe he will at least entertain the possibility of tuning the hard-liners out a bit more this time around.¶ All of which is why it’s too soon to cross immigration off the “maybe it will still get done” list just yet.

#### b) House progress and money

**York 8/23**

Byron York is chief political correspondent for The Washington Examiner, Written off for dead, immigration reform could still live, 8/23/13, http://mtstandard.com/news/opinion/columnists/written-off-for-dead-immigration-reform-could-still-live/article\_26eea02e-3c50-11e3-a446-001a4bcf887a.hThe Senate and House had not even settled the final details of ending the government shutdown before President Obama was on to his next priority. “We still need to pass a law to fix our broken immigration system,’’ Obama said on the night of¶ Oct. 16 as Capitol Hill scrambled to end the standoff. In case anyone missed it, the next morning he declared: “We should finish the job of fixing our broken immigration system.’’¶ There’s no doubt the president wants an immigration deal; he’s talked about it for years, and now can't put it off until another term. But could the Republican-controlled House of Representatives — exhausted, dazed and confused after the self-inflicted battering of the last few weeks — actually get itself together to pass a reform bill to go along with the Gang of Eight bill the Senate already passed?¶ The prospect alone makes some observers laugh. “People talking about immigration being next: have you been watching the House?’’ tweeted National Review’s Jonathan Strong during the worst of the shutdown battle, adding the hashtag “#craziness.’’ In this (entirely reasonable) view, there’s no way the fractured GOP could ever unite to pass such a far-reaching piece of legislation.¶ But that doesn’t keep immigration reformers from trying — and hoping. “There is still a window,’’ says one House GOP aide involved in crafting a reform proposal. “The leadership has said keep working on it and see what you can do.’’¶ Republican immigration proponents have been quietly talking to GOP members throughout even the craziest days of the shutdown and default fights. They report some progress. Yes, the most conservative House Republicans are mostly against them. But those with a libertarian bent are more open to the cause. The aide says reformers have had good meetings “with a few of those guys who were with Ted Cruz at Tortilla Coast,’’ referring to the House conservatives who met with the Texas senator at a Washington, D.C. restaurant and ended up holding out longest against a deal to end the shutdown.¶ But the problem for reformers is not the fractiousness of House Republicans, although that doesn’t help. The problem is that the reformers have never found a way to balance the border security demands of conservatives with the reformers’ demand for quick legalization of the 11 million-plus immigrants currently in the United States illegally. The conservatives must have security first, and then legalization (and even then, some won’t ever support reform). The reformers won’t wait until security is in place before starting legalization.¶ The Senate papered over the problem by throwing billions of dollars at border security in the final rush to pass the Gang of Eight bill. But that didn’t make the Gang's solution any more attractive to House conservatives. “I think there would be overwhelming opposition from within the ranks to going to conference with the Gang of Eight bill,’’ one conservative House member said in an email exchange. “Indeed, this would be way more divisive than the last four weeks have been for the House GOP.’’¶ The conservatives seek to avoid a scenario in which the House passes some sort of immigration bill, goes to conference with the Senate, and comes out of the negotiations with a bill that looks a lot like the Gang of Eight’s.¶ That skepticism is probably shared by a large number of House Republicans, perhaps enough to kill any reform proposal. But the reformers, led by Obama, are still trying. They have the Senate bill in their pocket. They have nearly unanimous Democratic support plus a significant number of Republicans. They have the support of powerful interest groups. And they have money, money, money.¶ At a recent Congressional Hispanic Conference meeting, Democratic Rep. John Yarmuth of Kentucky noted that the forces of comprehensive immigration reform include vastly wealthy businesses willing to spend big to win. And the other side? “There is no money on the other side of the issue,’’ Yarmuth said. “There is nobody out there ready to spend $100 million against this.’’¶ An initiative with that much money and that much clout behind it can never be dismissed. Which means that, even if comprehensive immigration reform appears to be dead, its opponents can never, ever assume the game is over.

#### a) Cuba lobby blocks the plan

**Quinones 13**

Brendan, Ending the Trade Embargo against Cuba—a Long Overdue Foreign Policy Pivot, 4/18/13, http://savejersey.com/2013/04/a-new-tac-for-cuba/

Standing as the greatest roadblock to removing the trade embargo against Cuba, the highly mobilized and politically powerful Cuban-American lobby has unceasingly pushed for hardline policies towards Cuba. Residing largely in the electoral vote rich state of Florida, Cuban-Americans have enjoyed a tremendous amount of political capital—capital they spend on keeping the embargo in place. Traditionally, the toss-up nature of Florida in presidential elections has made politicians from both side of the aisle weary of upsetting Cuban-Americans, hoping instead to garner their support come Election Day.

#### b) Engaging Cuba trades off with other issues

\*\*citing Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School

**Williams 13**

Carol, Los Angeles Times, Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors, 5/3/13, http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story

Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region with the official censure.¶ The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel.¶ There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.”¶ The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay.¶ It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime.¶ “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”

#### No link turn – no constituency in Congress – only a risk of PC decline

**Hakim et al 12**

Peter Hakim, Andrés Rozental, Rubens Barbosa, Riordan Roett, Ruben Olmos, “What Will Obama's Second Term Mean for Latin America?” [http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3135] November 8 //mtc

Q: Barack Obama was re-elected president of the United States on Tuesday. What is his vision for foreign policy and how does Latin America fit into his plans? How will Latin American leaders and their citizens react to the election results? What role did Latinos in the United States play in the election and what does that mean for U.S. policy changes on issues such as immigration, drugs and Cuba? ¶ A: Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue: "Any speculation about Obama's second term has to come mainly from his first-term performance. The campaign was about the candidates and their biographies—not about issues. Nothing suggests Congress will be more productive. The House remains virtually unchanged. The Senate will be more divisive still as most remaining moderate Republicans and Democrats resigned or lost their seats. We will know soon whether compromise is possible when the lame-duck Congress returns next week, and begins discussion of the fiscal cliff embroglio. The best guess is that Congress will find a way, not to resolve the problem, but to defer its consequences. The election results focused attention on immigration policy, which both Republicans and Democrats may be motivated to address. President Obama's declared intention to address immigration was surely reinforced by the huge Latino vote. Many of the Republicans who blocked previous immigration initiatives will resist again. But some recognize their party may become irrelevant unless they take seriously the Latino and black constituencies that accounted for more than 40 percent of Obama's total. U.S. immigration reform would be a welcome change in most of Latin America, particularly in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Obama may seek to pursue further openings to Cuba—but these will be limited unless the Cuban government shows a willingness to reciprocate with new human rights measures or political changes. Drug policy is not high on the U.S. agenda, but the approval in Colorado and Washington of ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana use may spark wider discussion on drug issues. But Mitt Romney offered the most significant policy proposal for Latin America, when called for more intensive U.S. efforts to pursue multiplying economic opportunities in the region." ¶ A: Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados in Mexico City and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution: "President Obama's re-election is a welcome development for Latin Americans in general, and Mexicans in particular. Although many of Obama's campaign promises in 2008 relevant to the region remain unrealized, there is a modicum of hope that as a leader in his second term, with more political capital to spend, he can at least make a stronger effort to tackle comprehensive immigration reform and trade issues critical to Latin American prosperity. Although I don't foresee any major change in the United States' foreign policy toward the region, especially as long as Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East remain priorities for Washington, that may not necessarily be a bad thing. We often complain when Washington pays too much attention to us, and equally when there's less overt interest in the region, but I believe that Obama has mostly shown a much more mature attitude toward Latin America over the last four years than has traditionally been the case. This will hopefully also be the case as his administration continues through 2016. Presumably, there will continue to be a strong focus on completing ongoing trade negotiations, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to open new opportunities for economic growth and hopefully a re-visiting of NAFTA as a key option to make North America more competitive on the global scene. Latinos played a key role in re-electing Obama, just as they did in 2008, and the one message that Republicans have to take home at this stage is that the anti-immigrant, exclusionary policies voiced during the campaign by Mitt Romney, the Tea Party and other conservatives were a key factor in their ultimate defeat. Many of Obama's liberal views on minority rights and tolerance turned out to be much more popular among Americans as a whole than the opposing Republican positions on those same issues."¶ A: Rubens Barbosa, former ambassador of Brazil to the United States: "In his second term, Obama will be more interested in looking for his legacy in history. The U.S. government will tend to be more proactive and try to increase its influence in the current hot spots: Pakistan, Syria, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. The relationship with China will continue to be high on the foreign policy agenda. Having in mind this scenario, Latin America will continue to be off the radar of U.S. decision makers: the region will remain a low priority for Washington. Despite this fact, the reaction of the Latin American leaders and citizens to Obama's re-election has been very positive. The role of Latinos in the election was important and in some places crucial. In terms of policy changes on issues such as immigration, drugs and Cuba, Obama will continue to face strong opposition from the Republican Party but I would not be surprised if new ideas could be advanced by the administration especially in relation to immigration and Cuba."¶ A: Riordan Roett, director of the Latin American Studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: "While the president's re-election is welcome in general terms, it is difficult to imagine Latin America will receive greater attention in the next four years. Congress remains deeply divided. The administration's foreign policy priorities will continue to focus on China, the Middle East and the ongoing fiscal challenges. Given the strong turnout by the Latino community, one area that should receive priority is continued immigration reform, but it is the third rail for the Republican majority in the House. In general, the democratic governments of the region will welcome the president's election without great expectation for major policy initiatives. The populist regimes will continue to denounce any democratically elected administration. The deadlock over Cuba will continue unless there is a dramatic leadership shift to a new generation. The major policy initiative that would be welcome in the region is on drug policy, but that issue will remain taboo."

#### Err neg – legislation can only deplete capital

**Fisher** (staffwriter) 1/6/**03**[Kenneth L., “Three’s a Charm,” Forbes, LN]

Having bucked the trend and added midterm power, will President Bush now legislate heavily, voiding the third-year magic? Unlikely. He can build political capital or spend it. Legislating means spending it, hurting his 2004 goals. I'd bet he keeps building capital. Remember, he needs marginal 2004 voters. If he pushes legislation, those he takes from will hate it more than those he gives to will love it. The losers will be energized for 2004 revenge; the winners, placated, will lose their urge to vote or help Bush's campaign.

#### Executive action - Requires Congressional approval – means our links apply

**LeoGrande 12**

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Congress has held a central role in U.S. policy toward Cuba ever since it codified the U.S. embargo into law in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton). To move beyond limited improvements in relations on issues of mutual interest or limited commercial activity– that is, to move toward the full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations– the president would have to win congressional approval to change the law.

#### Executive branch doesn’t shield the link

**Schier 11**. [Steven, professor of political science at Carleton College, specializing in American politics, “The Contemporary President: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political Power Trap” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol 41 Issue 4]

This leads to a “presidential power trap.” Maintaining authority is hard and frustrating work, and in seeking to maintain it, presidents encounter widespread constraints. Yet the modern presidency grants an incumbent many formal powers over executive branch administration, foreign, and national security policy. The power is there, if the authority is not. So why not use the power—via unilateral decisions, signing statements andexecutive orders—while you have it, if authority is so hard to garner? The risk is that by using such powers, a president effectively destroys his authority.Richard Nixon's presidency, with its constitutional violations, is the signal example of this, but one can find evidence of the authority problem and power trap among other recent presidencies. Carter took his authority for granted, ignoring the maintenance of its elite and mass aspects, and paid the price. Reagan gradually relied more on executive power as authority problems grew, leading to the Iran-Contra imbroglio. George H. W. Bush exerted war powers but never found a stable basis in political authority. Clintonusually suffered an authority shortage and found his use of powers under steady political attack. George W. Bush's use of war powers destroyed his authority during his second term.

#### Unilateral executive action still causes major backlash

**Piccone 13**

Ted, Senior fellow and deputy director at Brookings, Time to Bet on Cuba, 3/18/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone

These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.¶ Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.¶ Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.¶ The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state.¶ Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests.¶ In his second term, the president can (and should):¶ Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.¶ Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.¶ Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.¶ Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.¶ Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.¶ This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.